Reports of the recent events in Mali describe a country being overrun
by Islamists. The recent conflict began a year ago in January 2012, when the
people living in the north of Mali, the Tuaregs, succeeded in defeating the
Malian army in a number of battles for independence. The victories culminated
in the Tuaregs, led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA), declaring the independence of Azawad, their land in the north of Mali.
Around the same time, the Malian military ejected President Touré in a coup in
response to his mismanagement of the conflict.
Although the conflict was just the most recent uprising in a series of rebellions by the Tuaregs, this time their success was attributed to an influx of experienced fighters with heavy weapons from the recent Libyan civil war (who at the time were supplied with French assistance!). Independence of Azawad was short lived, however, as the MNLA’s allies, Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), turned on them in favour of enforcing Sharia law upon Mali. It is alleged that both groups have links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an organisation designated as terrorist by the U.S. and E.U.
By July 2012 the MLNA had lost control of the northern cities to its
previous allies. In October the UN Security Council adopted a French
resolution paving the way for military intervention in Mali. In December,
it authorised the deployment of an African-led
peacekeeping mission to help the government retake the north.
Two weeks later, the rebels, now reinforced by other Islamists groups
from northern Africa and led by AQIM, attacked and captured the city of Kona, a
city on the border of north and south Mali. Within days France announced it
would respond to a call for aid from the Malian government, and on 11 January
2013 conducted airstrikes on the rebels.
Paving the Way for Intervention
Tuaregs and AQIM
The nomadic Tuareg people are spread across the Sahara region, covering
parts of Mali, Niger, Algeria and Libya. The Tuaregs have been marginalised in these
countries and have some of the highest poverty rates in the world. It is not in
the interests of these countries for the Tuaregs to gain any power, as
independence from one country would likely quickly spread to others.
What was initially an uprising for independence was hijacked by
AQIM-affiliated groups to spread extremist views across Mali. But the Tuareg
Sufi-like beliefs have little in common with the extremist Wahhabi views of
AQIM, and AQIM has in fact set about destroying
Tuareg shrines and tombs in the area. Although they were allies against the
Malian government, it was always unlikely that the Tuaregs would adhere to
AQIM’s cause.
MSM reports focus not on the Tuareg’s battles but on the growing power
and attacks of AQIM, who by these accounts are trying to establish a new
powerbase in the Sahara. The Tuareg’s grievances and fight for independence is
largely ignored, as it does not benefit the countries involved – and threatens
to disrupt lucrative trade deals in the region, including those involving
Western powers.
French Interests
The African-led peacekeeping force will consist of African troops
bolstered by international forces. France has leapt into the battle before the
African troops have even been deployed. Why the haste?
France has a long history of conducting military action in its former
African colonies. For example, in 2011 France carried out airstrikes to remove
Laurent Gbagbo from the Ivory Coast, bringing an end to a civil war
precipitated by Gbagbo’s refusal to leave office after an electoral defeat.
In this case, the land the Tuareg’s call home is rich in natural
resources, including gold,
uranium and diamonds. In neighbouring Niger, Tuareg’s inhabit the lands
around two uranium mines
owned by French companies. Historically these mining companies have had
exclusive exploration rights in the region, but recently the government of
Niger has issued mining permits to other nations, including
China. Faced with investment from abroad, France stands to lose its exclusivity
in the region. In addition, any disruption caused by Tuareg independence would
likely affect French mining interests.
Hollande has stated
that France will stay in Mali until the nation is “safe, has legitimate
authorities, an electoral process and there are no more terrorists threatening
its territory.” The French military in Mali will not only be able protect
French commercial interests, but will also add leverage to ensuring a friendly
government comes to power – or ‘legitimate authorities’ as Hollande may prefer.
Ensuring a friendly government runs Mali may explain the military coup
which occurred in March 2012. The coup removed President Touré from power.
Touré was set to step down during the next election – which was due in April
2012, only one month after the coup occurred. Toppling a president who is about
to step down is not logical, unless the likely winner of the election was not
your preferred choice – which could have been the case for France. The Malian
and French governments had not been seeing eye-to-eye
recently, with Mali refusing to sign an accord with the French government that
would allow for Malian immigrants to be paid to return home, as well as not
granting France’s requests to build military bases on Malian soil. A new
government under the watchful eye of the French military may be more cooperative.
Selling Intervention
Selling military intervention on behalf of commercial interests to the
world would likely be impossible. The intervention must appear to be for more
altruistic reasons, for example humanitarian reasons, or to combat global
terrorists for the world’s safety.
This is exactly what the intervention in Mali is being sold as. One may
think it propitious that AQIM started another offensive only two weeks after
the UN gave the nod for military intervention, provoking Hollande to respond
that not stopping the terrorists would allow “a terrorist state at
the doorstep of France and Europe.” Why would AQIM choose that
moment, when a more logical choice would have been some time in the preceding
six months while the Malian government and military was in chaos?
It has long been suspected that AQIM is being financed
by the Algerian intelligence agency in much the same way that the Taliban is
financed by Pakistan’s ISI. If this is true, could it be that AQIM was ordered
to provoke the response, giving France an acceptable reason to intervene in
Mali? Could it be that only in appearance is France in Mali to combat AQIM, but
in reality to end any Tuareg resistance and ensure a friendly government comes
to power in Mali, to prevent disruption to French interests in the region?
Another twist is that there is popular belief
in Mali that the Tuaregs were in fact aided by France. There is some evidence
for this with the fact that they were supplied with weapons by the West while
in Libya. Could it be that the Tueregs have been used by France to cause a
crisis which can then be exploited for intervention? There seems to be
parallels with America initially funding al-Qaeda in Afghanistan only to later
use them as an excuse to invade the country.
Conclusion
Safeguarding commercial interests is no longer an acceptable excuse for
military intervention. It is unknown whether AQIM’s hijacking of the Tuareg
rebellion was simply chance or if the group was following orders from its
Algerian backers, or if the Tuaregs were initially aided by France, but either
way it provided France with an acceptable reason for intervention. With the non-cooperative
Touré toppled by a military coup, perhaps on French orders, the Tuareg
nationalistic uprising has been relabelled as another terrorist threat, where
France has shouldered the burden to defeat the extremists for the good of
Europe and the world. This labelling as good versus evil has made military
intervention more acceptable and will advance the goals of France by ending the
instability caused by the Tuareg rebellion and ensuring a government friendly
to France comes to power, which in turn will protect France’s claim to the region’s
natural resources.
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